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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
000O000 
EXCEPTIONS FOR APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant/Appellant asserts the following challenges to the 
Statement of Fact set forth by the Plaintiff/Appellee: 
1. There was no specific written Findings of Fact or 
Conclusions of Law on which to base the Court's decision to deny 
the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence. 
2. Although Officer Mele stated trailer 41 was "occupied" by 
Teddy Kinneman, Officer Mele could not have known the trailer was 
then "occupied" by anyone, let alone Kinneman, until he knocked on 
the door. He may have known Kinneman was the leaseholder of the 
estate, or that the trailer belonged to Kinneman, but he could not 
have known Kinneman "occupied" the trailer at that time. 
Additionally, Officer Mele did not state in his testimony that he 
knew Kinneman was a parolee. This was not known, or at least 
testified to, until after AP&P Officer Olsen arrived at the scene. 
3. The officers, either Law Enforcement or AP&P did not know 
whether Defendant had any reason to be in the trailer or not. 
Kinneman was not present in or at the trailer and Roberts and 
Pimental refused to give any information regarding Defendant. 
There was no information to determine whether Defendant was a 
trespasser, Kinneman's brother, or a drinking buddy. 
4. The search of the vehicle was conducted simultaneously 
with the arrest of Roberts. The search began prior to any possible 
consent, although, as acknowledged by Plaintiff, Roberts denied 
having given consent. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1 
DEFENDANT APPROPRIATELY AND ADEQUATELY 
PRESERVED AND RAISES THE ISSUES HE ARGUES, 
INCLUDING LACK OF CONSENT, EXIGENT 
CIRCUMSTANCES, AND PROBABLE CAUSE. 
The Trial Court ruled from the bench and denied Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress. Nevertheless, clear findings to support this 
ruling were not set forth. Appellee now attempts to use that 
dearth against the Defendant by arguing that Defendant failed to 
preserve or properly argue the issues raised. It is not the 
Defendant's obligation to set forth the findings on which the 
Court's ruling is based. Defendant argued at the trial level that 
consent did not exist, that exigent circumstances did not exist, 
and that the officers did not have probable cause, or reasonable 
suspicion to conduct their searches. On appeal, Defendant properly 
raises these contentions. 
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A- DEFENDANT DENIED HAVING GIVEN CONSENT AND 
ARGUED SUCH DENIAL IN ITS BRIEF IN CHIEF 
Defendant contended vigorously at the trial level that Roberts 
denied having given consent. In Defendant's Brief in Chief he 
never concedes that consent was given. The contention that no 
consent was given was at the very least impliedly raised by 
Defendant's arguments that neither a warrant nor exigent 
circumstances existed and therefore the search was illegal. If 
Defendant believed consent was given, or if Defendant did not 
oppose this possibility, the basis for Defendant's appeal would be 
eroded. Clearly, Defendant raised the issue in his appeal and this 
issue is not waived. Appellee has the obligation to argue Consent 
and Defendant can then attack the question of Consent. Defendant 
is arguing very clearly that the search by law enforcement officers 
and AP&P officers was illegal. A consent search, in most 
instances, is legal. Clearly, Defendant's brief raises, not 
concedes, the issue of consent. Otherwise, Appellee would not have 
to argue it existed. 
Officer Mele indicated he requested permission to "look 
inside" the vehicle. Mele testified that he received permission to 
"look." The officer did that and observed weapons. He then placed 
Roberts under arrest. Later, Roberts was told that the vehicle was 
now going to be searched, meaning opened and the weapons extracted. 
Roberts testified that he did not consent to the search of his 
vehicle. It appears from the transcript of the trial that Roberts 
was not asked whether the vehicle could be searched, but that the 
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officer explained in some detail why he was going to search the 
vehicle. While Roberts may have given permission to "look" in the 
vehicle, that does not extend into consent to search the vehicle. 
He has already indicated the vehicle did not belong to him, but to 
his mother. It is particularly interesting that the officers 
present approached Roberts a second time, after receiving 
permission to "look" in the vehicle to inform him they were going 
to search the vehicle. R. 57-58, 159. 
B. THERE EXISTED NO "REASONABLE FEAR" FOR 
THEIR OWN SAFETY IN THE MIND OF THE LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS. 
The officers, law enforcement and AP&P claimed to be concerned 
for their safety, but that concern had to be "genuine." The record 
does not support any such belief. At no time during this incident 
was a person, not a law enforcement or AP&P officer, near the 
vehicle and especially near with ability or potential of obtaining 
anything from the vehicle. If anything supports Defendant's 
contention that the police officers were overreaching and/or over 
reacting, it is their contention that they feared for their safety. 
The initial responding officer, Mele, radioed for back-up 
immediately upon pulling into the drive behind what he believed was 
the ATL vehicle. Back up arrived very guickly. His knock at the 
door was answered promptly (within 30 seconds). Before the passage 
of any time the back up officers were scouting the vehicle. While 
it is possible they could see the weapons through the windows there 
is no possibility these weapons in the vehicle were accessible to 
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anyone, especially Roberts, who at that time was being placed under 
arrest by Officer Mele. Roberts was then placed in a police 
vehicle and told the vehicle was going to be searched. At no time 
did any officer, either at the scene, in the suppression hearing or 
the trial articulate who presented any threat to their safety. 
State vs. Bradford, 839 P.2d 866 (Utah App. 1992) as cited by 
Appellee, is instructive herein. In Bradford, this Court clearly 
required that immediate control must be a possibility. It would 
clearly be stretching to say that Roberts could "break away from 
police control." It appears from the record that the officers 
informed Roberts they were going to conduct this first weapons 
search while he was sitting in the police vehicle with handcuffs 
on. R. 18-19. Additionally, at this time, there were at least 
three police officers, and perhaps two AP&P officers present, 
securing the scene. The State cites State vs. Cole, 674 P.2d 119 
(Utah 1983) as helpful. Indeed, certain elements of Cole show the 
lack of justification in the officer's searches in the instant 
case. In Cole, there was a denial of the existence of any weapon, 
and yet the officer observed one. In the present case, the 
arrestee has acknowledged the existence of the weapon. Drugs were 
not a part of the encounter with Roberts, as they were with Cole. 
In the case at bar, it appears that any volatility in the 
situation decreased with time, rather than increased. As time 
progressed, more and more officers arrived at the scene. Roberts 
was arrested almost immediately. As Pimental and then Defendant 
were located, they too were arrested. Never at any time did the 
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officers subject themselves to any challenge to their personal 
safety in this situation. As soon as a person was located, that 
person was arrested. 
If any portion of the officer's actions were clearly 
erroneous, it was a belief that they were in harms way or subjected 
to danger. To base any ruling of exigent circumstances on this 
belief would be clearly erroneous. It is unknown whether this 
formed the basis of the Trial Court's ruling however. 
C. DEFENDANT PRESERVED HIS CLAIM THAT 
PROBABLE CAUSE DID NOT EXIST TO GIVE THE LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AN EXCEPTION TO THE 
WARRANT REQUIREMENT. 
Defendant clearly contended, during the suppression hearing, 
that the officers did not have probable cause to conduct such a 
search. Defendant argued at the hearing that if there was probable 
cause to conduct the various searches, why not obtain a search 
warrant. No search warrant was ever obtained. The clear intent of 
this argument is that no probable cause existed. To suggest.that 
because the trial court did not mention the lack of probable cause 
in its ruling is to concede that the court did not find the 
officers did not violate the Defendant's constitutional rights to 
be free from search and seizure or that the Court found that the 
AP&P officers didn't have reasonable suspicion to conduct a parolee 
search because no explicit ruling was made on these issues either. 
The court failed to make any explicit rulings, and merely found 
"for the number of grounds stated..." that the motion was denied. 
Defendant never conceded the existence of probable cause more 
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argued the issue more expressly than the Court expressly ruled 
against him. Defendant questioned why, if probable cause existed, 
didn't the officer's obtain a warrant. Since a warrant wasn't 
sought, Defendant's argument is expressly that no probable cause 
existed. The Court was as likely to have ruled implicitly that no 
probable cause existed as it was to have not explicitly ruled that 
probable cause did exist. 
POINT II 
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE OFFICERS DID NOT 
HAVE EITHER REASONABLE SUSPICION OR PROBABLE 
CAUSE TO CONDUCT EITHER SEARCHES OF THE 
RESIDENCE OR OF THE AUTOMOBILE. 
The one thing that Defendant does concede is that a parolee 
does have a diminished right to privacy. Nevertheless, it is well 
established, as cited in Defendant's brief in chief, that while 
diminished, the rights to privacy and to be free from unreasonable 
search and seizure still exist. 
Roberts was arrested shortly after exiting the premise. While 
the officers had information that Kinneman resided there, they had 
no information he was home. Roberts denied that Kinneman was at 
the residence. Kinneman did not fit the description of any of the 
three occupants in the vehicle, and yet the officers were 
determined to gain access to the residence. All the officers, 
including the AP&P officers were restricted by the requirement of 
having reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing on the part of a 
probationer. The only probationer they knew was present was now in 
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custody. His suspected wrong doing was entirely outside of the 
house. The possession of weapons was independent of the house. 
There was no reasonable suspicion that Kinneman was home, nor was 
there any reasonable suspicion that there were any weapons in the 
house. AP&P officers claim that parolees are not to associate with 
criminals. This requirement, however, is vague. Is a criminal 
someone who has once committed a crime? This appears to be merely 
a hook upon which an AP&P officer can hang a desire to conduct a 
search barring any valid reason. 
POINT III 
The Defendant stands on his argument in his brief on point IV 
of Defendant's Brief and of Appellant's Brief and declines to 
further brief or respond to this point herein. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant has properly raised the issues, both at trial 
and on appeal, that he argues. The searches were illegal and 
evidence obtained from the searches was tainted such that it should 
have been suppressed. Had the evidence from the searches been 
suppressed, no conviction could have resulted. 
Respectfully submitted this j day of March, 1995. 
/ 
David M. Allred 
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